International Insulation from Politics and the Challenge of State Building: Learning from Kosovo

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Can international actors build effective state bureaucracies in postwar countries? While the literature on state institutions suggests they are best built under local ownership, this article shows how international actors in collaboration with local actors managed to build two effective state bureaucracies in postwar Kosovo: the police force and the customs service. Contrary to the article's Hypothesis 1 on local ownership, international actors insulated the effective bureaucracies from political and societal influences in order to prevent them from becoming sites of patronage. Thus, these institutions built on meritocratic recruitment and promotion. Employing a comparative research design, the article utilizes national survey data as well as data from 150 semistructured interviews conducted during ten months of fieldwork in Kosovo. By contrasting the state's constituent bureaucracies, which vary in effectiveness, and thus avoiding the reduction of the state to a unitary abstract actor, this research offers a fresh perspective on postwar state building. Furthermore, it contributes three innovative sets of indicators to measure effective bureaucracies: mission fulfillment, penalization of corruption, and responsiveness to the public. KEYWORDS: *international organizations, state building, Kosovo.*

ONE OF THE MOST DAUNTING TASKS IN POSTWAR TRANSITIONS TO PEACE IS THE transformation of the police force from an institution that represses ordinary people to one that protects their human rights and dignity. Similarly, the customs service is usually one of the most corrupt institutions, where revenues destined for the state's coffers end up in politicians' pockets. In postwar Kosovo, there is surprising evidence for the transformation of both the police force and customs service within a decade, despite the trend that these organizations tend to be corrupt and repressive elsewhere. Police officers in postwar Kosovo did not ask for bribes from citizens and they made politicians pay their traffic fines. Customs officers also treated traders and citizens impartially, and were effectively penalized when they cheated.

In light of the international endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine,[1] scholars must take account of the extent to which ambitious international assistance can contribute to building effective state bureaucracies. The proliferation of internal wars has led international actors to carry out one

of the biggest and most challenging "experiments" in international politics following the end of the Cold War: participating actively in rebuilding states and societies.[2] However, the US military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq among others have made the enterprise of external state building and democracy assistance controversial. Scholars and pundits who focus on the difficulties associated with building state bureaucracies and democracy in these two cases caution against carrying out such expensive, complex, and potentially ineffective interventions in the future.[3] Yet the mandates of international organizations and the proliferation of guidelines on how to build state capacity and democracy after war indicate the continuing interest that they have in this area.[4] This is because effective state bureaucracies and democratic institutions enable better life chances for individuals and societies; promote development;[5] and help prevent civil war, terrorism,[6] and failed states.[7]

Much of the literature assessing state capacity and the success of international interventions in building states treats the state as a single entity.[8] Such a unitary conception of "stateness" can be overly abstract and fails to distinguish between state bureaucracies that vary in their effectiveness. It is therefore necessary to unpack the state into its core bureaucracies; that is, the police force, customs service, central administration,[9] and court system.[10] By opening the black box of the state and analyzing its constituent core bureaucracies, we can examine analytical differences in bureaucratic effectiveness that are crucial for understanding how political actors can build states that are able to provide relevant public goods to their populations. From this perspective, "bureaucratic effectiveness" refers to the "impartiality in the exercise of public authority."[11]

The analysis that I employ in this article challenges the prevailing belief that strategies of international actors are less important than local ownership in building effective bureaucracies. Instead, I argue that international organizations can build effective bureaucracies by insulating public administrators from political influence, thereby recruiting and promoting officials according to merit. When international organizations became a constituency for meritocracy, an effective police force and customs service were built in Kosovo.

I turn now to a critical examination of the existing literature on state building, which provides the theoretical anchor for this article. Following this review, I describe the design of the empirical study and the measurement of institutional performance. Finally, I explain the variation in performance among the different state bureaucracies and conclude with a discussion of the important role that meritocratic recruitment and promotion due to international insulation play in the construction of state bureaucracies.

State-building Hypotheses

International interventions that aim to build states are highly controversial among scholars.[12] *State building* refers to the sum of multiple actors' pur-

poseful actions to enhance the bureaucratic capacity of the state.[13] Some scholars question the motivations of international actors because they see parallels between the current state-building efforts and previous failed attempts by European colonizers to build states and societies in the global periphery.[14] Other scholars claim that the impact of colonizers was not uniformly negative, but depended on the colonizer and local conditions.[15] Current state-building efforts are similar to earlier colonial enterprises since both were applications of Western models to non-Western societies. Unlike the European colonies of the nineteenth century, however, the liberal international interveners aim to stay for a limited time and leave soon after they have achieved their goal of stability.[16]

The rate of success of modern state-building efforts has also been mixed, using the resurgence of civil war as an indicator. Since the goal of building state institutions after war is considered a precondition for building sustainable peace, the resurgence of civil war undermines this claim. Madhav Joshi and T. David Mason estimate that 48 percent of the 125 civil wars that occurred in 71 countries between 1945 and 2005 became violent again and were not able to sustain the peace process.[17] Most of these countries have not resorted to war after the intervention, but the missions have often incorporated more ambitious goals such as the construction of democracy and effective state bureaucracies. Due to democratization and state-building challenges, several scholars and practitioners argue that the international state-building missions have not been successful in Timor Leste, Bosnia, and Kosovo.[18]

What accounts for the variation in effectiveness among the different state bureaucracies? It may be posited that the higher the local ownership of domestic bureaucracies, the higher the capacity of the bureaucracy to provide public goods.[19] The expectation is that the prescriptive one-size-fits-all approach of international actors does not work well across different contexts.[20] Historical models of state formation also imply that local ownership and processes are more important than international influence for strengthening state capacity.[21] Local ownership works through various mechanisms. First, local stakeholders know their priorities and can define their solutions better than international bureaucrats due to their superior knowledge of local conditions.[22] The development literature also points to the importance of local knowledge for needs assessment and participation.[23] Local knowledge matters because of the mechanisms of feedback and public accountability. Feedback from local people takes their needs into account. In democracies, local people also hold their elected leaders accountable through elections, but they have little or no power over international actors.[24]

Despite these convincing arguments, it is important to recognize that the degree of local ownership varies along a continuum. On the low end of the spectrum, international organizations set the agenda, make the rules for state institutions, and administrate these institutions without the collaboration of

key local stakeholders such as politicians, bureaucrats, or the public. On the other end, full local ownership occurs when local leaders set the agenda, build, and lead state institutions according to their own priorities. Scholars who advocate full and immediate "local ownership" assume that the country has endogenous resources to devote to the process.[25] However, this expectation is belied by the high number of failed and weak states in the international system; up to 60 of 194 states fall into this category.[26]

Statist theories of bureaucracy, however, emphasize that any measure that enhances the insulation of the bureaucracy from political and societal pressures increases its performance.[27] Bureaucracies thrive when they are sufficiently autonomous from social demands, as they create disinterested routines and implement policies in an impartial manner. Weberian ideal–type bureaucracy is characterized by administrative centralism, clear division of labor, formal rules, hierarchical relations among the full-time staff, and impartial adjudication of cases based on legal order.[28] Thus, meritocratic recruitment and professional socialization within state bureaucracies is posited to enhance state building. Applied to an international intervention, bureaucracies will perform better when international actors take measures to insulate central state bureaucracies from political and societal influence. *International insulation from political and societal influence* refers to the effective control by international actors of the local bureaucracies for a defined period of time.

The two main competing hypotheses can thus be summarized as follows:

Hypothesis 1: If local actors create and take ownership of the institutions, then these state bureaucracies are more likely to be effective.

Hypothesis 2: If international organizations support meritocratic recruitment actors and promotion through the insulation of the nascent institutions from political and societal influence, then these state bureaucracies are more likely to be effective.

As I show in this article, Hypothesis 2 was affirmed in Kosovo. Bureaucratic capacity was enhanced when international organizations insulated the bureaucracy from political influence, making recruitment and promotion meritocratic.

The Design of the Study

Based on a large body of literature that identifies international resources as important for the difficult task of state building, Kosovo serves as an important case for testing hypotheses about state building.[29] As the United Nations administered Kosovo from 1999 to 2008, all the major international institu-

tions (European Union, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE], World Bank, and International Monetary Fund [IMF]), Western powers, and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) invested 3.5 billion euros and significant human and technical resources in the territory to keep the peace and build governance capacities. The international investment in Kosovo has been high. At US$557 per capita for the first two years of international administration, the investment was more than twice the ratio for Bosnia ($227) and Timor Leste ($240), and almost ten times higher than the resources placed in Afghanistan.[30] With its high literacy rate and better road infrastructure than most postwar contexts around the world, Kosovo's modernization made state building more likely.

The research on which this article is based relies on the comparative method where both institutional outcome and the type of international intervention vary.[31] Whereas most studies focus on the abstract notion of the unitary state, my approach is based on the comparison of core bureaucracies that vary in their performance. The unit of analysis is the site of international intervention: a specific institution that international actors either managed or supported. The main state bureaucracies investigated are core state bureaucracies: the Kosovo customs service, courts system, police force, and central state administration.[32] The construction of these highly complex bureaucracies poses the most difficulties for international or domestic state builders. All of these bureaucracies are susceptible to corruptive behavior—violation of the rules of the organization—since low-level bureaucrats have wide discretion to implement policies in an impartial or corrupt manner.

This design also controls for various factors. The international organizations invested substantially across the various bureaucracies, and there was no discernible difference in terms of international resources among the local bureaucracies. Since the building of local capacity was coordinated centrally by the UN, the effectiveness of certain local bureaucracies cannot be explained by the higher level of international coordination.[33] Local employees of these state bureaucracies also received similar salaries that were funded by the same state budget.[34]

Controlling for the influence of institutional legacy, the bureaucracies that I selected for this case study did not carry positive legacies from the past since they were created from scratch by international and local actors after the war. Following the NATO bombing in 1999, Kosovo became an internationally administered territory under the United Nations. The UN also had a mandate to build self-governing institutions that were all transferred to local ownership on Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008. International actors preferred to construct new democratic state institutions that followed liberal cultural scripts. To enhance their legitimacy, new states such as Kosovo followed symbolic scripts of statehood that emanated from the West for all their bureaucracies.[35] The construction of brand new

institutions was also made possible by the departure of Serb administrators after the war and the discontinuity of Kosovo's autonomous institutions from 1989 to 1999.

These bureaucracies are also comparable in another aspect: the Kosovo Serb inhabitants rejected all of them. The Kosovo Serb inhabitants in Kosovo, constituting less than 10 percent of the population, do not recognize Kosovo's new state and prefer to be ruled by the Serbian government in Belgrade. Kosovo Serbs have significantly less interaction with Kosovo institutions compared with other minorities in Kosovo, especially the Serbs who live in northern Kosovo.[36] Since the Serb rejection of Kosovo institutions is not due to their perceived effectiveness, but due to their attachment to Belgrade and rejection of the new Kosovo state, the comparison of the bureaucratic effectiveness of various institutions can be done by observing what the Kosovo residents who interact with them report about the institutions' performance, responsiveness, and corruption.

These bureaucracies also varied in their insulation from political and societal influence. Based on the legal interpretation of the UN Security Council resolution that mandated an international mission in Kosovo, international organizations transferred early authority of central administration to democratically elected leaders in 2002. While the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) retained formal ownership of the court system, it effectively transferred the authority of recruitment and promotion to local ownership in 2002–2003. Nevertheless, international organizations retained formal and effective control over the bureaucracies of customs and police services until 2008 since the Security Council resolution mandated that the UN mission would have authority over matters of sovereignty and security.[37] As a result of the legal mandate, only the customs service and the police force were insulated from political and societal influence.

To investigate my central research questions, I conducted qualitative interviews, used survey data, and analyzed internal and official reports and strategies of international organizations, government, and civil society organizations. This study draws on 150 formal semistructured interviews with government officials and members of civil society and international organizations in Kosovo conducted during field research in the summer of 2007 and August 2008–May 2009. I interviewed thirty-nine international participants and four Kosovo Serb participants in English. The four Kosovo Serb participants included one NGO professional, one university professor, one broadcast media journalist, and one political leader.[38] I interviewed the Kosovo Albanian participants in their native language, Albanian. I used the interviews to elucidate the participants' ideas about the main issues that Kosovo's state institutions face, their interactions with internationals, and their perceptions of effective and ineffective institutions.

Measuring Bureaucratic Effectiveness
Across the Various Organizations

Properly designed bureaucracies will be more effective when they: (1) fulfill their mission, (2) penalize corruption, and (3) respond systematically to the public.[39] *Mission evaluation* refers to the institution's fulfillment of its own overall goal. To evaluate its mission, I used survey data on public satisfaction with each institution and elite evaluations through my own semistructured interviews as well as other quantitative and qualitative data available for each institution.

How does the public view the performance of the different bureaucracies in Kosovo? Survey data indicate that the public consistently approves of the performance of the Kosovo police while they are less satisfied with the performance of the central government and the courts. As seen in Figure 1, public satisfaction with the police service has been nearly constant since the beginning of the polling in 2002, three years after the first local police officers started enforcing the law, and it has remained high until Kosovo declared independence in 2008. Three years after the transfer of authority of the police force to Kosovo institutions, there has been a discernible decline of public satisfaction with Kosovo police. Public satisfaction with the Kosovo central government is low, especially after the central government was seen as responsible for the political and economic situation in Kosovo in 2005. While the UN Development Programme (UNDP) survey data did not include questions on citizen satisfaction with the customs service, various experts praised its effectiveness unprompted during the interviews.[40]

While the mission of the central government is to prepare laws for Kosovo's parliament, as well as formulate and implement policies and strategies, even interviewees from the central government agreed with the general perception held by the public, civil society, and international organizations that the government lacked capacity to prepare and enforce policies. Even Kosovo's former prime minister responsible for building the central administration in the crucial early period between 2002 and 2004 admitted in an interview the poor performance of his administration: "We have low quality public administrators in our bureaucracy. They get some training, but since their quality is low to begin with, their capacity remains very weak."[41] International organizations have also produced critical reports on the performance of the central administration.[42]

While the core mission of the Kosovo judiciary is to be independent and impartial in its application of the legal order, the court system fails to provide access to justice for Kosovo's citizens. A huge backlog of cases has made it difficult for Kosovo judges to render timely verdicts.[43] An elite interviewee claimed that it would take years for a judge to give a verdict on a simple car accident, so most people do not even try to go to court to resolve disputes.[44]

Figure 1   Public Satisfaction with the Work of the Various Bureaucracies

Note: The Kosovo Pulse Polls and Early Warning Reports are funded by the UN Development Programme and US Agency for International Development. The surveys are based on face-to-face interviews that rely on randomly selected samples. These surveys use the overall answers from all of the various respondents in Kosovo. The Kosovo Serbs either declined to answer questions about the Kosovo institutions, or responded by expressing their lack of interaction and satisfaction with them.

Indeed, the lackluster performance of the judiciary has a negative impact on the other institutions. Even if police catch criminals, they can go unpunished because courts do not try them on time. Courts have also failed to act on corruption cases sent by the Kosovo Anti-Corruption Agency.

The police force is more capable of fulfilling its mission than the previous bureaucracies. As the main state bureaucracy tasked with its monopoly on violence, the mission of the Kosovo police force is to implement the rule of law in Kosovo professionally, effectively, and efficiently.[45] The general view among local experts and international organizations is that Kosovo police officers deal well with routine low-level crimes, respond quickly to media requests, and behave politely and professionally toward citizens. Police effectiveness has declined after its increased politicization in 2008.

The core mission of the final state bureaucracy, the Kosovo customs service, is to collect revenue for the state budget and facilitate the movement of goods and people across borders. The customs service is responsible for raising general revenues for the state from international trade at the international borders. The service therefore sustains the government's budget with revenue that is then spent on infrastructure, education, health, welfare, and

administration. Customs revenues constitute 65 percent to 70 percent of the annual state budget. The service is fully funded through the state budget and not through donors. Indeed, revenue from the customs service has ensured that Kosovo's self-government budget has been fully financed by domestic sources since 2003.[46]

Are the various bureaucracies able to penalize corruption? Since corruption is the violation of the impartial rules of a bureaucracy, the penalization of corruption can be measured by three indicators: general public perceptions of the corruption in each institution; the percentage of interviewees that have provided bribes to the institution's public officials during the past year; and the presence of institutional mechanisms that actually discipline public officials when they abuse their office.

As seen in Figure 2, Kosovo interviewees rank the courts, the customs service, and the central government as bureaucracies with large-scale corruption, while the police force is judged to be the least corrupt of all the domestic and international institutions. Other surveys have corroborated the finding that few police officers expect bribes in exchange for services.[47] The internal investigation unit, an institutional mechanism within the police force, also effectively conducts internal investigations of minor offenses within the organization.[48]

Figure 2   Public Perception of the Presence of Large-scale Corruption

Source: UNDP Kosovo, "Early Warning Report #25" (Pristina: UNDP Kosovo, 2009).

Note: The Kosovo Pulse Polls and Early Warning Reports are funded by the UN Development Programme and US Agency for International Development. The surveys are based on face-to-face interviews that rely on randomly selected samples. These surveys use the overall answers from all of the various respondents in Kosovo. The Kosovo Serbs either declined to answer questions about the Kosovo institutions, or responded by expressing their lack of interaction and satisfaction with them.

As in other states, the customs service in Kosovo has a high potential for corruption since it processes taxes at the border and its officials have strong incentives to misrepresent the goods in exchange for a large bribe.[49] A functional internal institutional mechanism worked relatively well to control corruption in the customs service. The unit of professional standards of the Kosovo customs service examined complaints about possible misconduct by customs officers and disciplined the officials who abused their public position. All but two of the original thirty-seven Kosovo Albanian officers who started the service in 1999 were removed from the service by 2008 because of such vetting.[50] Therefore, despite the high potential for corruption, the customs service is successful in penalizing corrupt behavior.

However, the anticorruption internal mechanism in the central government did not work since there were no trials for corruption until 2012. The public generally believes that politicians could steal with impunity. In an outrageous public statement, a former minister of culture in Kosovo responded to the corruption charges by journalists by claiming: "I have abused my father's money. Why shouldn't I abuse the state budget?" The family metaphor also indicates the patronage basis of the central government. The minister did not lose his job after this announcement.[51] Indeed, no minister has been indicted for corruption by the Kosovo courts or central government since 1999.

The judicial system had internal formal institutional mechanisms to discipline corrupt officials that did not work in practice. Before the 2008 declaration of independence, the Judicial Investigation Unit under the authority of UNMIK was responsible for examining complaints of professional misconduct by Kosovo jurists. In 2008, this investigation unit found misconduct in 87 out of the 164 cases received during that year and forwarded them to the Kosovo Judicial Council. The Judicial Council, the independent institution responsible for disciplining jurists for misconduct, was not working properly because of many vacancies in the organization's top ranks. Even though its Office of Disciplinary Council and Judicial Audit had charged some judges with corruption, the courts have yet to try their cases.[52]

The third and final indicator of bureaucratic effectiveness, *responsiveness to the public,* refers to the extent to which the institution responds to public requests for information. By law, the state bureaucracies in Kosovo are obliged to answer public requests for information within two weeks after receipt of the request. To test bureaucratic responsiveness, I utilized the data from two tests conducted by activist NGOs in Kosovo. The first test measured the percentage of replies from each institution to requests for information submitted by the public. The Youth Initiative for Human Rights sent requests for access to official documents and ranked the institution according to the percentage of proper replies to the requests.[53] The second NGO created a transparency index of the government bureaucracies in Kosovo: the Speak

Up Movement sent each major bureaucracy a questionnaire with twenty-four questions about how open they were to the public. Each bureaucracy had to answer questions about laws, personnel qualifications, publication of important information online, and classification of public documents. The NGO then analyzed the responses to these questionnaires and developed an index of responsiveness.

The central government institutions in Kosovo are generally not responsive to the public. When the Youth Initiative for Human Rights tested the central government by sending public requests for information, the government answered only one in four requests for information, a low score of 25 percent. Nine of nineteen ministries did not answer even a single request for information.[54] In its 2010 transparency index, the Speak Up Movement gave the central government the lowest rating of a closed level of openness to public requests.[55]

The judicial system was also one of the least responsive bureaucracies. The national and local courts had a 16 percent response rate.[56] The state prosecution office in Kosovo also had a rudimentary organizational and legal approach to public relations. In the 2010 transparency index, it ranked at the lowest score of a closed level of openness, similar to the central government.[57]

In contrast, the customs service is consistently ranked as the most responsive bureaucracy in Kosovo by the various NGO tests. According to the responsiveness to public requests test by the Youth Initiative for Human Rights, the customs service received the maximum possible rating of 100 percent and stood out above all other local institutions. The service responded to all the public requests for information included in the test.[58] In the 2010 transparency index of the government bureaucracies, the customs service was named the most transparent institution, accumulating 90 percent of all the possible points, although, according to that study, the service was "not fully open."[59]

The Kosovo police were less responsive to civil society and other public requests for information. In the bureaucratic responsiveness test conducted by the Youth Initiative for Human Rights in 2006, both the Kosovo police and police academy had a 20 percent response rate. The Kosovo police also received 55.5 points out of 100.0 in the transparency index because, despite their daily media communications and a useful website, the police force did not have clear institutional mechanisms to translate the law on access to information into timely responses to public requests. According to the index criteria, the Kosovo police were judged to be partially open. This indicates a low level of openness to public requests, but one that is still higher than the closed level assigned to the central government and the courts.[60] However, the Kosovo police had good communication channels with local and international media. Based on a survey of Kosovo journalists in 2009, the Speak Up Movement named the Kosovo police the most transparent institution. Overall, the Kosovo police service demonstrates a medium level of bureaucratic

responsiveness. Despite its openness toward the media, the service is less responsive to the public and civil society.

The triangulation of the measures therefore paints a consistent picture of the performance of these various bureaucracies. While the police force and the customs service tended to fulfill their mission, penalize corruption in their ranks, and be more open to the public, the central government and the judicial system failed in all three areas. The fact that these diverse measures tended to cluster shows that there were important differences in bureaucratic effectiveness, and that the indicators I used tapped into these differences.

Explaining Patterns of Bureaucratic Effectiveness

In this study, I investigate state building when international organizations follow one of two approaches: (1) insulation from political influence, or (2) local ownership. Insulation from political influence occurred when the international organization controlled the recruitment processes into the bureaucratic organization and structured the bureaucracy according to the mission of service to the society. In practice, representatives of international organizations formed majorities on the boards that tested and vetted the candidates for public office. Recruited and promoted on merit, public officials were insulated from politicians and society and they learned to enforce rules impartially in a professional bureaucracy. Alternatively, local ownership occurred when local actors controlled the recruitment and advancement processes into the bureaucracy, usually resulting in patronage.

International organizations insulated the customs service and the police force from societal influence and promoted a public service ethos through the socialization of their employees. Therefore, the evolution of these organizations emphasized performance and public accountability. International administrators recruited, trained, and vetted Kosovo employees according to principles of merit and representativeness. The principle of merit meant that employees were recruited, promoted, or fired based on their performance and ethics. They were also expected to play the role of impartial public servants. The principle of representativeness meant that these bureaucracies emphasized affirmative action for minorities in order to build a multiethnic state. Since public officials were selected through competition, they valued performance. As these officials trained and rose through the ranks together, they learned to communicate and monitor each other's performance. Hence, they were better positioned to limit corruption in their ranks despite low salaries.

UNMIK Police recruited indigenous police officers through rigorous examinations in Kosovo. The recruitment and screening process involved an oral interview, a written exam, a psychological test, a medical exam, a physical agility test, and a background investigation.[61] All of the new recruits had

to pass tests and vetting for criminal behavior, and in 1999 80 percent of them were rejected.[62] A senior Kosovo police officer who had worked in the Yugoslav police before 1989 admitted when I interviewed him that "the United Nations did a much better job at recruiting professionals than our politicians would have done."[63] The OSCE also created and refined basic police training from scratch in Kosovo because the organization did not have previous experience or blueprints on building police academies.

The Kosovo police force was only partially insulated from political influence since the international administration made a compromise with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to have 50 percent of the initial police recruits from the demobilized Kosovo fighters. Despite the initial compromise, international actors tried to keep the police force insulated from political influence. After 2000, the OSCE did not use the 50 percent quota, but a lower, informal one. By 2007, 25 percent of the police force (2,000 officers) were former KLA fighters; only half of them applying through the quota, and the rest applying and being accepted individually. So, only 12.5 percent of the current police force entered through the quota system for former fighters.[64] After the 2008 transfer of authority to Kosovo institutions, several police officers who were KLA veterans and close to the ruling politicians in Kosovo rose to the top of several units in the police force, including finance, and special forces. The finance unit accused unjustly and arrested without good evidence the technocratic head of the central bank of Kosovo who was later released.[65] The special police forces reacted strongly against nonviolent demonstrators in Pristina in 2012.[66] Therefore, the partial insulation of the Kosovo police force made it more susceptible to increased politicization after the transfer of authority to local government.

The insulation of the customs service from political influence was the main approach that the international community used to build a professional bureaucracy. From early on, one key task of the international administrator was to prevent political interference from the Kosovo self-government institutions or UNMIK. According to the international customs founder, "the point was to deliver the UN mandate and the principles of the constitutional framework without fear or favor of the individuals involved."[67] The customs founder also imported European Union rules and institutional mechanisms to penalize corruption in the service.[68] The European Commission had already codified its experience in expanding the customs union to its new entrants from the European Union through its customs blueprints—guidelines for strengthening the customs sector. Such blueprints allowed for overall coherence in terms of formal rules as well as flexibility for its field operations.[69] When I asked the local director of the customs service if the Kosovo employees adapted or rejected any of the blueprints, he smiled and said, "No, we had to adapt to the blueprints," and continued to speak enthusiastically about their technical implementation in the organization.[70]

Both formal and on-the-job training are part of the preparation of the customs officers. First, the accepted recruits go through eight weeks of formal training: five weeks to learn theory and three weeks to receive on-the-job training. Then, there is a six-month probation period during which the customs officers work under the supervision of a senior officer. At any stage of this process, the recruit can be warned, and subsequently fired, if he or she does not meet the expected performance or takes bribes.[71] In order to keep the job, officers have to learn to apply rules impartially. They monitor and communicate with each other about the expectations of the job. Career advancement within the customs service also emphasizes performance indicators on the job and not personal connections to political elites. The service has clear promotion policies and all customs officials have grades within a definite hierarchy.

Let us now examine the bureaucracies that were transferred early to local ownership. In the absence of international insulation, both the central government and the court system exhibited the presence of politicized appointments in their ranks. Public officials in the central administration were recruited according to political or nepotistic criteria, favoring the personal and party networks of the elected political leaders. Insider observers of the central administration claimed that each minister hired individuals from his own network for government posts when the UN devolved part of its powers in 2002: "Many of the ministers in the government did not have other professions in the curriculum vitae, and they started their professional life with the position 'minister.'"[72] Even positions that were low in the hierarchy, such as specialists, administrative assistants, drivers, and bodyguards, were given to insiders. Government officials who were not members of political parties were warned that, if they did not join the ruling party, they would lose their job.[73]

Government employees learned that, in order to remain in their job, they had to be loyal to their patron and provide services to particularistic networks. This paradigm produced servility as employees focused on being obsequious to the boss instead of on their performance. The bureaucrats learned to behave obsequiously to their patron and condescendingly toward the general public. They often spent too much time worrying about their employment to do their jobs effectively. In addition, employees exhibited low morale in their jobs, often claiming that if they had a different offer, they would move immediately.[74] As a result, the bureaucracies were not able to implement their policies impartially or penalize corruption.

The turnover of parties in power meant that new political appointees replaced officials who were contracted under the previous government. While there are no official data on how large the turnover is, I found that various Kosovo interviewees had left jobs in the government, and international inter-

viewees complained that they spent time and money training politically appointed public officials who subsequently left office once a new government assumed power.[75] Even when the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society created a program to bring highly qualified diaspora Kosovars to work in the Kosovo government, the project coordinator confirmed that none of these officials continued to work in the government after that contract ended.[76] The high turnover of public officials undermined the creation of a stable community of colleagues who would communicate and monitor each other's performance. High turnover also weakened the impact of technical assistance from international organizations. Unfortunately, since technical assistance constituted 80 percent of international aid since 2005, most international aid for these bureaucracies was wasted.

Even though UN Resolution 1244 tasked UNMIK with building an effective and impartial judiciary, the UN mission did not proactively pursue that goal. When it noticed that Kosovo judges were giving lighter sentences to Albanians than to Serbs, the United Nations introduced international judges to tackle interethnic and war crimes.[77] UN judges did not have much interaction with local judges, and they focused mostly on the sensitive political or ethnic cases. The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) is also focusing on the sensitive political and war crime cases, but EULEX international judges are working more closely with local Kosovo judges. With ad hoc training and little interaction, the capacity of the courts remains low. A senior official in the UNMIK Department of Justice admitted that "UNMIK understood for a long time that its job was not to develop Kosovar judicial authorities, but to handle high-profile cases—corruption, ethnic impunity, war crimes. . . . Our job was not to train or build capacity."[78] Faced with a difficult task, UN bureaucrats chose to redefine their mission in the judiciary by managing the situation, instead of transforming it.

In sum, as illustrated in Table 1, bureaucracies that were transferred early to local ownership became sites of patronage and ineffective performance. However, within a decade, insulated bureaucracies became organizations that effectively fulfilled their mission, penalized corruption, and responded faster to the public. This is not a rosy picture of success, however. The customs service and the police force are significantly more professional than the other bureaucracies in Kosovo. However, that does not mean they are as professional as British and Swedish administrations. They are comparable to state bureaucracies of the new European Union member states such Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, and Slovakia. It is likely that, despite the challenges,[79] these bureaucracies will continue to perform relatively well. After all, the new Kosovo state needs the customs service revenue, and the public has high expectations for the performance of police.

Table 1   Measures of Bureaucratic Effectiveness and the Type of International Approach

Bureaucracy	International Approach	Mission Fulfillment	Penalization of Corruption	Responsiveness	Overall Effectiveness
Customs service	Insulation	High	Medium to high	High	High
Police force	Partial insulation	Medium	Medium to high	Medium	Medium
Central administration	Local ownership	Low	Low	Low	Low
Courts system	Local ownership	Low	Low	Low	Low

Discussion of Findings and Conclusion

Contrary to the prevailing expectations, these findings contradict Hypothesis 1 on local ownership for state building, which states that high local ownership leads to more effective state bureaucracies. When international actors devolved the central administration and the courts quickly to the control of elected leaders, these bureaucracies became embedded sites of patronage politics in which employees were loyal to only top politicians, without substantial concern for public service. The socialization of employees in such bureaucracies emphasized loyalty to the patron or boss above following impartial rules and procedures. The international funding that flowed to these institutions through technical assistance projects failed to influence them since the bureaucracy was geared toward providing jobs rather than implementing policies. International strategy was therefore more important than resources in influencing bureaucratic effectiveness.

Democratic accountability is therefore not a sufficient mechanism for the construction of effective bureaucracies in clientelist contexts. My findings suggest that the construction of effective state institutions requires the insulation of bureaucracies from political and societal actors as well as an emphasis on meritocratic recruitment and promotion.

The construction of effective bureaucracies therefore confirms the Weberian statist theory, which states that any measure that enhances the insulation of the bureaucracy from societal pressures increases its performance.[80] Martin Shefter, a student of patronage and bureaucratic organizations, points out that a political constituency is necessary to push for and sustain the transition from patronage to a professional civil service system.[81] Until now, scholars have primarily investigated the domestic sources of such political constituencies.[82] However, when international actors have wide authority to implement state-building strategies, the source of such political constituencies can be international. Since the goal was building local capacity to take over state institutions, local ownership was an outcome but not the means of

such transformation. Before criticizing the application of Western rules of meritocracy to other societies, we should remember that meritocratic recruitment in the state bureaucracy was first invented in China, centuries before Western Europe experimented with such procedures.

Careful sequencing of the transfer of authority from international actors to local actors is also an important implication. Until the bureaucracies are professionally constructed, elected politicians will not have the power and the authority to interfere with recruitment and promotion practices in the organization. Elected leaders will still be able to appoint a small proportion of the senior administration officials, but civil service commissions with a majority international participation will build the various layers of bureaucracy at the low, middle, and senior levels. This process will ensure that the leaders in these bureaucracies will not be political appointees, but rather the beneficiaries of meritocratic promotion.

Even after the transfer of political authority to local leaders, international actors may still remain engaged in the state-building enterprise in order to build domestic constituencies and support the postwar country's membership in international organizations. *International exit* in the context of international administrations refers to the "transition of political authority from international to local actors."[83] A constituency for civil service reform needs to be created that links domestic and international actors. As the international organizations transfer authority to elected officials, they should keep some temporary safeguards to assure that the elected leaders will not politicize the bureaucracy under their authority. The civil servants who have been recruited according to merit will obviously become a constituency that supports the depoliticized civil service. In addition, the local media, civic associations, and even political parties could form a domestic constituency to ensure the sustainability of bureaucratic capacity.

In the absence of a domestic constituency, effective bureaucracies require international protection against politicization. As the decline of the performance of the police force due to increased politicization indicates, such a process is not irreversible. How can the effective bureaucracies retain and improve their performance after independence, as international supervision declines substantially? How can more bureaucracies become insulated from political interference? We do not yet know the answers to these questions. My findings suggest that, until a domestic constituency for civil service reform exists, international organizations serve as the main guarantor against further politicization of the bureaucracies. It is possible that once a broad constituency of bureaucrats, civil society organizations, and political parties supports civil service reform, international organizations will then be in a position to decrease pressures on elected leaders for impartial bureaucracies.

We probably will not see many new instances of international administrations such as that of Kosovo. However, both local and international actors

can do more to promote effective state bureaucracies and democratic institutions. Meritocratic recruitment and promotion leads to the creation of effective state bureaucracies that are impartial in the application of the laws. Domestic leaders can enhance their public administrations by requiring computerized entrance examinations as well as provide temporary administrative roles to capable international administrators who do not have ties to political elites. For instance, Sierra Leone's president appointed a British national, paid by Great Britain, to be the first chief of the reformed postwar police force. Several years later, as police performance increased, the police leadership was transferred to a Sierra Leonian citizen.[84]

Researchers and international organizations should start collecting specific data on the presence of civil service rules and procedures that support meritocratic recruitment and promotion in the various states in the world and make this information public. If possible, such data should be gathered at the bureaucratic level instead of the unitary level of the state. Civil society organizations, the media, and other international organizations may use this information to pressure government officials to rein in patronage practices.

If more states experiment with various processes that improve meritocratic recruitment and promotion, they will provide better security and welfare for their people. Such effective states tend to be more peaceful, in addition to supporting the economic development of their country. In the end, a state that performs effectively enriches the lives of both elites and ordinary citizens. Only elites and their close supporters benefit from a state where patronage reigns. ⊕

Notes

1. Responsibility to Protect redefines sovereignty as the responsibility of a government to protect its population. If a government fails to do that, the international community takes on that task. Ramesh Chandra Thakur, *The Responsibility to Protect: Norms, Laws, and the Use of Force in International Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2011).

2. Overall, twenty-one international complex interventions have occurred since the end of the Cold War in postwar countries. See Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations* (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 1–2; Simon Chesterman et al., *Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005); Richard Caplan, *International Governance of War-torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction* (London: Oxford University Press, 2005). Interventions may focus on the military aspect of peacekeeping or peace enforcement as well the political task of forming a power-sharing government in a postwar society. My emphasis in this article is on civilian assistance to build domestic state bureaucracies since these bureaucracies are essential for the provision of security and public services.

3. Jason Brownlee, "Can America Nation-build?" *World Politics* 59 (January 2007): 315, 339; David M. Edelstein, "Exit Lessons: The History of Past Military Interventions Yields Five Clear Guidelines on How to Get Out of Iraq and Afghanistan," *Wilson Quarterly* 33, no. 4 (2009): 51.

4. For a comprehensive review of major policy documents of different international organizations in the areas of peacebuilding and state building, see United States Institute of Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2009).

5. Philip Keefer, "What Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development—And Vice Versa?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 7, no. 1 (June 2004): 247–272.

6. See James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States," *International Security* 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004); Stephen D. Krasner, "Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States," *International Security* 29, no. 2 (Fall 2004).

7. See Robert H. Bates, *When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-century Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Robert I. Rotberg, *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

8. For classical statements on unitary state analysis, see Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992*, rev. paperback ed. (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992); Peter B. Evans, *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). Recent publications include Anna Maria Grzymala-Busse, *Rebuilding Leviathan: Party Competition and State Exploitation in Post-communist Democracies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Conor O'Dwyer, *Runaway State-building: Patronage Politics and Democratic Development* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).

9. Both of the terms *central administration* and *central government* refer to the central executive bureaucracies in the various ministries and the prime minister's office.

10. For recent books that unpack the state into its constituent bureaucracies, see Steven Solnick, *Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); Brian Taylor, *State Building in Putin's Russia: Policing and Coercion After Communism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

11. See Bo Rothstein and Jan Teorell, "What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions," *Governance* 21, no. 2 (2008): 166.

12. Brownlee, "Can America Nation-build?" pp. 315, 339; Gerhard Knaus and Felix Martin, "Travails of the European Raj," *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 3 (2003): 60–74.

13. See Michael Wesley, "The State of the Art on the Art of State Building," *Global Governance* 14, no. 3 (2008): 373. Bureaucracies are specialized and differentiated state organizations that implement policies across time and space.

14. David Chandler, *Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-building* (London: Pluto, 2006); William Russell Easterly, *The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done so Much Ill and so Little Good* (New York: Penguin, 2006), pp. 269–310.

15. Atul Kohli, *State-directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Diet-

mar Rothermund, "Nation Building in India Under British Rule," in S. C. M. Paine, ed., *Nation Building, State Building, and Economic Development: Case Studies and Comparisons* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2010).

16. James Dobbins et al., *Europe's Role in Nation-building from the Balkans to the Congo* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), pp. xvii–xix.

17. Madhav Joshi and T. David Mason, "Civil War Settlements, Size of Governing Coalition, and Durability of Peace in Post–Civil War States," *International Interactions* 37, no. 4 (2011): 389.

18. For Timor Leste, see Jarat Chopra, "Building State Failure in East Timor," *Development and Change* 33, no. 5 (2002): 979–1000; for Bosnia, see David Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton* (London: Pluto, 2000); for Kosovo, see Iain King and Whit Mason, *Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006). Similarly, while RAND studies view Germany and Japan as clear cases of successful US interventions, other scholars disagree. For the RAND perspective, see James Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), pp. xix–xxii. The critics include Brownlee, "Can America Nation-build?" pp. 323–324; Alexander Cooley, *Logics of Hierarchy: The Organization of Empires, States, and Military Occupations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 145.

19. Jeremy M. Weinstein, "Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention in Comparative Perspective," Working Paper No. 57 (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2005).

20. Peter Evans, "Development as Institutional Change: The Pitfalls of Monocropping and the Potentials of Deliberation," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 38, no. 4 (2004): 30–52.

21. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States,* chap. 3.

22. See James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 6, 316–319; Paula M. Pickering, *Peacebuilding in the Balkans: The View from the Ground Floor* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).

23. Robert Chambers, *Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last* (London: Intermediate Technology, 1997), p. 297.

24. Easterly, *The White Man's Burden,* pp. 269–310.

25. See, for instance, Chandler, *Empire in Denial,* p. 221; David Chandler, *From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention* (London: Pluto, 2002); Weinstein, "Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention."

26. "The Failed State Index 2009," *Foreign Policy* (22 June 2009), www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings.

27. Max Weber, *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. xxxix–xliii, 40; Richard Franklin Bensel, *Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859–1877* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 94–237; Evans, *Embedded Autonomy;* Barbara Geddes, *Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

28. Weber, *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society,* pp. xxxix–xliii.

29. Various scholars hypothesize that the more international resources that are available for state building, the more effective the new institutions will be. See Fearon and Laitin, "Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States"; Krasner, "Sharing Sovereignty"; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). However, critics argue that high levels of inter-

national aid create dependencies that have perverse consequences on the country's development. See Nicolas Van de Walle, *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

30. Dobbins et al., *Europe's Role in Nation-building,* p. 221.

31. See Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 59, 80, chap. 8.

32. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States;* Geddes, *Politician's Dilemma;* Taylor, *State Building in Putin's Russia*.

33. Various scholars argue that the implementation of state-building projects suffers if there is not sufficient coordination among multiple international actors. See Anne Holohan, *Networks of Democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Fearon and Laitin, "Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States."

34. Having an adequate salary is an important incentive for employees, according to the rational choice perspective. A common critique of external state building is that local bureaucracies pay little compared to international organizations and, therefore, fail to attract competent employees. See Francis Fukuyama, *State-building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 39–41. In Kosovo, the salaries for local employees in the various state bureaucracies were similar, between 200 and 250 euros, and five times lower than salaries for local professionals in international organizations.

35. Martha Finnemore, "Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism," *International Organization* 50, no. 2 (Spring, 1996): 331–332; Dominik Zaum, *The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 132.

36. International Crisis Group, *North Kosovo: Dual Sovereignty in Practice* (Pristina: International Crisis Group, 2011).

37. Charles Brayshaw, former principal deputy special representative of the Secretary-General, UNMIK, personal communication with the author, 8 July 2011.

38. The Kosovo Serb interviewees mentioned that the Kosovo Serbs who collaborate with Kosovo institutions face ostracism within the community and threats. One interviewee was beaten up by local thugs when he decided to criticize the corruption of local Kosovo Serb institutions.

39. See Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman, *Evaluating Peace Operations* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2010), pp. 93–132.

40. Shpend Ahmeti, executive director, GAP Institute for Advanced Studies, interviewed by the author, Pristina, Kosovo, 5 September 2008.

41. Bajram Rexhepi, former prime minister of Kosovo, interviewed by the author, Mitrovica, Kosovo, November 2009.

42. One report questioned the administrative capacity of the central government by pointing out the large number of incoherent laws. *Kosovo Public Service and the Administrative Framework Assessment,* Support for Improvement in Governance and Management, a joint initiative of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the European Union, 2008, p. 20, www.sigmaweb.org/dataoecd/32/12/43913956.pdf. The European Commission has also been critical of patronage employment in central administration. See European Commission, *Kosovo (Under UNSCR 1244/99) 2011 Progress Report* (Brussels: European Commission, 2011), p. 10.

43. The total number of unresolved civil cases pending at the municipal level in 2008 was 160,477, in addition to 36,000 criminal cases. European Commission, *Kosovo,* p. 14.

44. Mark, International Civilian Office, interviewed by the author, Kosovo, October 2008. Many interviewees gave frank answers that could endanger their jobs and

livelihood if such quotations were traced back to them. In order to protect the anonymity of my sources, I have used first name pseudonyms for most of them.

45. Kosovo Police, www.kosovopolice.com/, accessed 26 June 2010.

46. In contrast, the US provides direct budget support for administrative expenses in many states, including Georgia and Afghanistan.

47. Gallup, *Balkan Monitor Insights and Perceptions: Voices from the Balkans* (2008); Gallup, *Balkan Monitor Insights and Perceptions: Voices from the Balkans* (2009–2010), www.balkan-monitor.eu.

48. For instance, as a result of their investigations, seven police officers faced disciplinary action and had to resign from the force in 2008. Kosovo Police, "Annual Report 2008," p. 25, www.kosovopolice.com/repository/docs/Raporti_vjetor_2008.pdf, accessed 26 June 2010.

49. In terms of actual bribing, surveys indicate a low level of corruption in the customs service. The actual percentage of survey respondents who personally gave bribes to customs officers in 2008 was less than 1 percent, the same as the average in the European Union; Gallup, *Balkan Monitor Insights and Perceptions* (2008). The percentage was even lower in 2009, but slightly higher in 2010; Gallup, *Balkan Monitor Insights and Perceptions* (2009–2010).

50. Paul Acda, EULEX official, interviewed by the author, Pristina, Kosovo, 18 April 2009.

51. Mark, International Civilian Office, interviewed by the author, Kosovo, October 2008.

52. International Crisis Group, *The Rule of Law in Independent Kosovo* (Pristina: International Crisis Group, 2010), pp. 14–16.

53. Youth Initiative for Human Rights, *Monitoring of the Law on Access to Official Documents* (Pristina: Youth Initiative for Human Rights, 2007). Such a bureaucratic responsiveness test is similar to the test that Robert Putnam and his associates used to measure how Italian regional governments were responding to citizens' requests for information. See Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 73.

54. Youth Initiative for Human Rights, *Monitoring of the Law on Access to Official Documents*.

55. Speak Up Movement, Indeksi i Transparencës së Institucioneve Dhe Ndërmarrjeve Publike në Kosovë (Transparency index of government institutions and public enterprises in Kosovo) (Pristina, Kosovo: Speak Up Movement, 2010), pp. 15–23.

56. Youth Initiative for Human Rights, *Monitoring of the Law on Access to Official Documents*.

57. Speak Up Movement, Indeksi i Transparencës.

58. Youth Initiative for Human Rights, *Monitoring of the Law on Access to Official Documents*.

59. Speak Up Movement, Indeksi i Transparencës, pp. 25–28.

60. Ibid., pp. 28–31.

61. Ylber Bajraktari et al., *The PRIME System: Measuring the Success of Postconflict Police Reform* (2006), p. 49, https://www.princeton.edu/bobst/docs/WWS 591b_final_Police_Reform_Report.pdf.

62. Eileen Kovchok, "Kosovo Police Service Trainers," *Law and Order* 49 (2011): 59.

63. Arti, interviewed by the author, 2008.

64. International Crisis Group, *An Army for Kosovo?* (Pristina: International Crisis Group, 2006), p. 3.

65. For a review of the politicization debate, see the Albanian edition of the investigative television show *Jeta në Kosovë,* "The Influence of SHIK Security Services on Kosovo's Justice System," 9 May 2011, www.jetanekosove.com/drejtesia /780/Alb.

66. Development for Democracy, Reaction Memo 1, Police Overreaction (2012), http://d4d-ks.org/punimet/reaction-memo-nr-1-police-overreaction/?lang=en, accessed 17 January 2014.

67. Acda, interview by the author, 2009.

68. Ibid.

69. European Commission, *Customs Blueprints: Pathways to Modern Customs* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007).

70. Naim Huruglica, director of customs service, interviewed by the author, Pristina, Kosovo, 13 November 2008.

71. Mirela, customs service, interviewed by the author, Kosovo, 13 November 2008.

72. Luan Shllaku, Foundation for Open Society, interviewed by the author, Kosovo, 17 September 2008.

73. Valon, central government official, interviewed by the author, Kosovo, 16 September 2008.

74. Altin, think-tank analyst, interviewed by the author, Kosovo, 11 November 2008.

75. Anita, development agency vice-director, interviewed by the author, 1 October 2008.

76. Ilire, interviewed by the author, Kosovo, 2 October 2008.

77. Michael E. Hartmann, "International Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo: A New Model for Post-conflict Peacekeeping" (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2003), pp. 11–13.

78. Senior official in the UNMIK Department of Justice, quoted in International Network to Promote the Rule of Law (INPROL), *Literature Review: Rule of Law Lessons Learned from the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)* (Washington, DC: INPROL, 2009), p. 70.

79. Four years after the declaration of independence in Kosovo in 2008, the customs service and police force remained effective despite political pressures from the central government. The prime minister attempted to remove the director of the customs service immediately after the transfer of authority in 2008, but the director was reinstated under intense political pressure from the European Union and the US embassy. Local media outcry and international pressure also forced the changes in a newly politicized unit of the financial police in Kosovo. Paul Acda, former EULEX official, e-mail communication with author, 28 May 2013.

80. Weber, *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society,* pp. xxxix–xliii, 40; Bensel, *Yankee Leviathan,* pp. 94–237.

81. Martin Shefter, *Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 28.

82. But see Milada Anna Vachudová, *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

83. Dominik Zaum, *The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 242.

84. Osman Gbla, "Security Sector Reform Under International Tutelage in Sierra Leone," *International Peacekeeping* 13, no. 1 (2006): 78–93.